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Abstract
The past decade has seen many proposals for future Internet
architectures. Most of these proposals require substantial
changes to the current networking infrastructure and end-
user devices, resulting in a failure to move from theory to
real-world deployment. This paper describes one possible
strategy for bootstrapping the initial deployment of future
Internet architectures by focusing on providing high avail-
ability as an incentive for early adopters. Through large-
scale simulation and real-world implementation, we show
that with only a small number of adopting ISPs, customers
can obtain high availability guarantees. We discuss design,
implementation, and evaluation of an availability device that
allows customers to bridge into the future Internet architec-
ture without modifications to their existing infrastructure.
1. INTRODUCTION
To be successful in their deployment, designers of new
technologies must not only solve technical issues (e.g., com-
patibility, efficiency, etc.), but must also offer convincing
incentives for users to invest time and money to adopt the
technology. Without proper incentives, achieving substan-
tial real-world deployment is likely a futile effort.
The deployment of new Internet architectures is especially
challenging given the millions of hours of effort that have
gone into building the networks these new architectures are
designed to replace. Over the past two decades, a num-
ber of new ideas that provide strong technical advantages
over existing networks and protocols (e.g., mobile IP [21]
and IP multicast [5]) have been proposed. However, they
have failed to gain mainstream adoption. The resistance to
change may be justified, since sizeable financial investments
and millions of hours spent on training make embracing po-
tentially disruptive changes a less than ideal proposition for
incumbents.
Future Internet Architectures (FIAs) aim to solve many
problems with current-generation networks (e.g., security,
availability, and scalability). To solve these issues, FIAs
suggest using radically different paradigms. For example,
NDN [12] provides efficient data delivery by treating data
(rather than the end-points) as a first-class citizen on the net-
work; MobilityFirst [25] designs a mobility-centric network;
XIA [8] delivers a flexible means of evolving the Internet’s
core; and SCION [34] and NIRA [33] focus on making
the Internet more resilient to failures. Despite the appeal-
ing benefits offered by these architectures, they have yet to
gain mainstream adoption.
In this paper we present a case study on how to boot-
strap deployment of FIAs by focusing on how to convince
early adopters. We demonstrate that deployment of a new
Internet architecture can provide tangible benefits to early
adopters while requiring minimal changes to existing infras-
tructure during the initial stage of deployment. Our goal is
to present a feasible adoption plan to gradually (and without
friction) gain traction. Thus, instead of proposing a generic
one-size-fits-all plan (i.e., attempting to convince manufac-
turers, ISPs, developers, and end users that they should im-
mediately deploy a particular FIA), we focus on providing a
single tangible benefit to early adopters: increased network
availability. For this goal, we propose using FIAs as fallback
(backup) networks when specific quality of service metrics
are not met by current Internet paths. We note, however, that
we focus exclusively on initial deployment. Later steps will
need other incentives since network availability alone may
be insufficient to motivate wide-scale deployment.
Based on simulations, real-world implementation, and
evaluation, we show that with only a small number of de-
ploying nodes, new Internet architectures, such as NIRA
and SCION, can transparently improve network availability
while introducing negligible performance overhead once de-
ployed. Our results provide evidence that the seemingly im-
possible task of deploying a new Internet architecture may,
in fact, be possible.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We describe the value proposition for both end-users
and ISPs showing that our approach benefits from nat-
ural scalability and wide-scale customer base reacha-
bility (Section 3).
• We design and implement DENA (Device for EN-
hancing Availability), a bump-in-the-wire device that
can automatically detect and establish fail-over data
paths over FIAs, and transparently fail-over to those
paths when network quality is low. DENA requires
no user configuration and is designed to be minimally
1
intrusive (Sections 4 and 5).
• We demonstrate, through a full-scale BGP simula-
tion over the CAIDA Inferred AS Relationship dataset
(45,942 ASes), that a small number (less than five) of
ISPs deploying a FIA can significantly reduce attacks
on availability (Section 7).
2. RELATED WORK
We review related work in two overarching themes: in-
creasing network availability and incremental deployment of
new architectures.
Several proposals aim to increase Internet availability.
One avenue towards this objective is through the use of indi-
rection. Andersen et al. [1] propose Resilient Overlay Net-
work (RON) to shorten recovery time incurred from BGP
outages by using an alternate network path through an over-
lay. While the work demonstrates the effectiveness of an
overlay against BGP outages, it does not describe Internet-
scale deployment issues where different ISPs can own dif-
ferent parts of the overlay. Our paper discusses deployment
incentives for possibly competing ISPs.
Another closely related work is Advertised Reliable
Routing Over Waypoints (ARROW). In their paper, Pe-
ter et al. [22] show that by redirecting traffic through tun-
nels, Internet reliability can be enhanced. The authors val-
idate their claim through BGP simulations considering IP
prefix hijacking attacks. The work herein corroborates the
results of Peter et al. finding that redirecting traffic to a vic-
tim AS using a tunnel provides higher resilience against pre-
fix hijacking attacks when an adversary targets the victim’s
IP prefixes. Our simulation (see Section 6.4) encompasses a
more comprehensive adversary strategy; unlike in ARROW,
we analyze the case where adversaries are capable of attack-
ing the tunnels as well as the victim AS.1 Additionally, our
paper studies incremental deployment aspects of FIAs, while
the ARROW paper considers a minimal change that can pro-
vide the greatest increase in availability. For instance, the
authors do not discuss how and who will manage the Inter-
net Atlas, which is crucial for incremental deployment since
such an atlas likely requires global coordination between the
deploying ASes.
There have been proposals to study incremental deploy-
ability aspects of an architecture. In LISP (The Locator
Identifier Separation Protocol), Saucez et al. [28] postulate
“there must be a clear deployment path that benefits early
adopters”. Ratnasamy et al. [24] distilled the properties that
facilitate the deployment of a new architecture. They pro-
pose the use of IP anycast as the means to access the new ar-
chitecture. We build upon the insights that Saucez et al. and
Ratnasamy et al. have provided in terms incremental deploy-
ability. However, we avoid using IP anycast as the medium
to access the new architecture because the use of anycast
1We have contacted the authors and confirmed the limitations of
adversary model described in Section 5.8 of their paper (i.e., the
adversary only announces the prefixes of the victim).
may preclude ISPs from engaging into a direct business re-
lationship with customers. Instead, in our proposal an inter-
ested customer purchases a value-added service from a de-
ploying ISP, and the ISP would distribute a gateway device
to access its service.
3. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we motivate the need for network avail-
ability for ISPs and customers focusing on limitations of the
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).
3.1 Demand for Network Availability
The ever-increasing dependence on the Internet in our so-
ciety has made availability a critical requirement for network
infrastructure. We define availability to be the resilience
against any type of attack or other network fault (e.g., mis-
configuration) that could prevent or decrease the quality of a
network connection.
Due to their core business model (i.e., offering connec-
tivity to customers), ISPs require high network availability.
We can infer the existence of this demand by analyzing the
number of multi-homed endpoint ASes on the Internet. Us-
ing a snapshot2 of the CAIDA Inferred AS Relationships
dataset [4], we observe that 22,386 out of 38,772 (approx-
imately 57%3) endpoint ASes have two or more provider
ASes. Of these multi-homed ASes, 819 have five or more
provider ASes. While there are reasons other than availabil-
ity for ASes to be multi-homed (e.g., load-balancing, cost-
balancing), multi-homed ASes are more likely to be accessi-
ble even if one of their BGP paths is unavailable.
Customers span the spectrum from residential end-users
to large-scale enterprises to governments. A recent study
found that residential users are becoming sensitive to qual-
ity of their home Internet connections [26]. Businesses, es-
pecially those which are geographically diverse, make use
of Virtual Private Network (VPN) technologies to intercon-
nect sites. For these businesses, the availability of intranet
resources is tied to the availability of their Internet connec-
tivity. Governments may want to ensure availability of their
critical infrastructure to control smart grids or to ensure the
success of online elections [20].
3.2 Degradation of Network Availability
Several factors may impact network availability on the In-
ternet. These factors range from transient link failures to
route changes to security vulnerabilities in routing protocols.
Attacks on BGP are one of the major contributing factors to
availability issues on the Internet today [3]. One of the most
common threats in this context is known as IP Prefix Hijack-
ing. Briefly, a BGP route is defined as an IP prefix and an
AS-level path which leads to that prefix. Thus, IP prefix hi-
jacking denotes the advertisement (malicious or accidental)
2The CAIDA dataset was collected on August 1st, 2014.
3Note that this ratio could be an over-estimate as there are single-
homed stub ASes without AS numbers.
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of a prefix which is not authorized for use by an advertis-
ing entity and which diverts the BGP path for that prefix to
the hijacker. Due to the lack of authentication in BGP mes-
sages, IP prefix hijacking is relatively easy to perform as
the adversary can announce any prefix of another AS (the
standard threat model for this type of attack). As a conse-
quence, false injection of update messages can be used to
launch blackhole attacks [11] which hijack and drop traffic
to compromise availability. Although the following does not
fundamentally protect BGP against hijacking attacks, we de-
scribe two practices that help in building a more secure path
in BGP.
• /24 Prefix Announcements: Due to BGP’s default
route selection policy, longer prefixes are harder to
compromise than shorter prefixes [2, 10]. However,
ISPs are hesitant to accept /24 prefix announcements
pervasively because doing so would dramatically in-
crease the size of routing tables on their border routers.
• Shorter BGP Paths: Shorter paths are usually more
resilient than longer paths because border routers typ-
ically prefer routes with shorter AS-Path length. As
the number of AS hops decreases, there are fewer net-
work locations (routers) from which an attack could
be launched. Thus, if a route between two end-hosts
could be divided into multiple shorter path segments,
it would be more secure than the single longer path
between the two end-hosts. We confirm this effect
through BGP simulation in Section 7.
3.3 Value Proposition for Early Adopters
Value for ISPs. As early adopters, ISPs that deploy an
FIA obtain several benefits. First, deploying ISPs benefit
from higher availability by increasing their resilience to hi-
jacking attacks (see Figure 8); and, the benefit exist even
with a small number (see Figure 9) of deploying ASes.
The benefit is accrued without sacrificing the scalability
of BGP routing tables. If every domain were to announce
/24 prefixes for higher availability (i.e., stronger resilience
against IP prefix hijacking attacks), the BGP routing table
does not scale. Instead, in our approach, since only a few
initially deploying ASes announce /24 prefixes to protect
their tunnels, the overhead on BGP routing tables is small.
Furthermore, beyond initial deployment, our approach ben-
efits from natural scalability; as more ISPs deploy the FIA,
fewer /24 announcements are needed since two contiguous
ISPs that deploy FIA can communicate directly without a
/24 announcement. Consequently, we expect the number of
announced /24 tunnel prefixes to increase during the early
stage of deployment and decrease as more ISPs deploy.
Second, there may exist a business incentive for deploy-
ing ISPs to offer high availability to customers of other ISPs
(e.g., via IP tunnels as described in Section 4.1). Lastly, ISPs
can create a niche market for a set of customers who demand
higher availability than BGP can provide but cannot afford
dedicated leased lines.
Value for Customers. Customers may obtain high-
availability (even if the customer’s local ISP does not pro-
vide such functionality) by subscribing to a remote provider
via an access tunnel. More importantly, customers can be
bridged into high-availability architectures without changes
to software on their local devices or modifications to their
Internet service. We show one method to achieve this zero-
configuration setup in Section 4.
4. OVERVIEW AND REQUIREMENTS
FOR A HIGH-AVAILABILITY DEVICE
Guaranteeing benefits under partial deployment alone is
not sufficient for a successful initial deployment. Customers
must be able to subscribe to an FIA without carrying out
any complicated tasks, such as configuring their network de-
vices or updating them to a new network stack—updating
the network stack on light bulbs, cameras, televisions, refrig-
erators, and other Internet of things devices may be infeasi-
ble. To this end, we develop a bump-in-the-wire interface
device which we refer to as DENA (Device for ENhancing
Availability) to be placed between the customer’s network
and their Internet provider. An alternative approach could
be to deploy such interface devices at the ISPs themselves
(this approach is used by Peter et al. [22]), completely re-
moving end-user involvement. However, this strategy would
preclude users from subscribing to the FIA if their immedi-
ate ISP does not deploy it.
The primary function of DENA is to increase Internet
availability to its subscriber by leveraging a given FIA as
a fail-over network. That is, if the IP path between two cus-
tomers (deploying end-points) becomes unavailable, DENA
would detect the unavailability and automatically fail-over
to a path through the FIA by encapsulating IP packets.
To provide high-availability guarantees, DENA devices
need to implement four functionalities. For a given commu-
nication flow between a subscriber and a peer, the DENA
needs to 1) identify the presence of a peer; 2) if present, es-
tablish FIA path(s) to be used as fail-over; 3) continuously
measure the packet loss rate of the path(s); and 4) fail-over
to a path offered by the FIA if necessary.
Although our design and implementation of DENA re-
mains generic for any FIA that is capable of providing high-
availability guarantees (e.g., NIRA and SCION), through-
out the following sections, we draw on SCION as the cho-
sen example FIA. We find it useful to focus on one particular
FIA to keep the discussion concrete and to drive the narra-
tive. In addition, our access to the global SCION testbed
enables for a thorough evaluation of our implementation.
For space reasons, we do not provide details of the
SCION architecture in this paper; however, the discussions
in the following sections should be clear without any prior
knowledge of SCION (Zhang et al. [34]).
4.1 ISP Deployment Model
To minimize impact on their current infrastructure, ISPs
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Figure 1: Three tunnels that are used in FIA deployment. In each
subfigure, circles marked Di represent ASes that have deployed
FIA, and circles marked NDi represent non-deploying ASes.
are likely to deploy a high-availability infrastructure as an
overlay to their current networks [23]. Customers, as well as
other ISPs will use IP tunnels to bridge into these overlays.
Hence, constructing reliable tunnels is essential to provide
high-availability guarantees. To this end, /24 prefix blocks
are used to reduce the risk of traffic hijacking attacks against
the tunnels.
For our deployment strategy, we define the following tun-
nel types (shown in Figure 1), and explain how tunnels are
protected against hijacking by using the practices described
in Section 3.2.
Access Tunnel. A tunnel with which a deploying ISP can
offer high-availability services to customers whose ISPs do
not support these features. As shown in Figure 1a, to protect
the tunnel between A and itself from hijacking, the deploy-
ing AS (D1) announces a /24 prefix that contains the IP ad-
dress used for that tunnel. This announcement reduces the
probability of an adversary successfully hijacking this tunnel
if they are multiple hops away from A and D1.
Inter-site Tunnel. A tunnel that connects two non-
contiguous deploying ASes over the Internet (see Figure 1).
The ASes need to protect the tunnels that link deploying sites
from prefix hijacking attacks. Similar to the access tunnels
above, each of the two ASes announces a /24 prefix block
that contains the IP address used as its tunnel end-point ad-
dress.
End-to-end Tunnel. A series of tunnels that consist of
access tunnels and inter-site tunnels to connect customers A
and B over the FIA deployment. For instance, in Figure 1,
the end-to-end tunnel consists of one access tunnel and one
inter-site tunnel.
4.2 End-to-End Communication Scenario
Before describing the design and implementation of
DENA, we sketch a high-level picture of how an end-to-end
communication flow would behave in a typical Internet-wide
scenario shown in Figure 2.
In this scenario, there are two SCION providers (Prov1,
Prov2) that have deployed gateways (GW1, GW2) to serve
their SCION subscribers. There are three end-hosts (Host1,
Host2, Host3), where Host1 has a public IP address, and
Host2 and Host3 are behind a NAT. To enhance their Inter-
net availability, Host1 has subscribed to the SCION service
from Prov1, and Host2 and Host3 from Prov2. All hosts have
placed DENA devices as bump-in-the-wire on their network
connection.
Consider a scenario where Host2 initiates communication
to Host1. Upon receiving a packet from Host2, DENA2
checks if it knows the peer DENA associated with the des-
tination address of the packets. If it does not know the as-
sociated peer, DENA2 initiates a Discovery Process (Sec-
tion 5.1) and exchanges bootstrapping information that is
necessary for constructing SCION overlay paths to the re-
mote peer. In addition, the bootstrapping information con-
tains information necessary for NAT traversal, which we dis-
cuss in Section 8.
A DENA monitors the packet loss rates of the paths (both
IP and SCION paths) to all of the discovered peer DENAs
(Section 5.2). Whenever the quality of the IP path to a peer
DENA degrades below a given threshold, and the quality of
a path provided by SCION is acceptable, all of the flows
associated with the peer DENA are encapsulated and redi-
rected to the SCION path to ensure continued availability.
Redirection over SCION is accomplished via a series of
tunnels using the packet structure shown in Figure 3. The
first and last tunnels are access tunnels (see Figure 1a) be-
tween the DENAs and the SCION gateways. The interme-
diate tunnel is a series of inter-site tunnels (see Figure 1b)
that links the two SCION ASes to which the two end-hosts
are subscribed.
In our communication example between Host2 and Host1,
the packets from Host2 to Host1 traverse from DENA2 to
DENA1 via tunnels across DENA2 to GW2, Prov2 to Prov1,
and GW1 to DENA1. DENA1 removes the tunnel header
and the SCION header, and forwards the regular IP packets
to Host1.
IP Tunnel
Header
SCION
Header
Data Header(e.g., IP+TCP) Data Payload
Figure 3: Packet structure over SCION
4.3 Requirements
Previous work in the incremental deployment literature [9,
24,28] has discussed desirable properties for an architecture
to gain adopters. These properties mainly refer to the need
for incentivized adoption, independence from ISPs that hosts
buy their Internet connection from, and compatibility with
existing devices and infrastructure. Based on these proper-
ties, we define the design requirements for our own incre-
mental deployment device.
Req 1. No Changes to End-hosts: End-hosts should not
require any modification to make use of the FIA. Rather,
DENA should operate as an interface between the current
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Figure 2: An example of end-to-end communication. The destination identifier is implemented as the 5-tuple information. See Section 5.
Internet and FIA, enabling a smooth transition between the
two architectures.
Req 2. Zero configuration: DENA should operate as a
“plug-and-play” device and should not require any con-
figuration by users. However, similarly to wireless access
points, a DENA should allow fine-tuning of parameters by
advanced users.
Req 3. Robustness: DENA should work under a major-
ity of network configuration scenarios and in the presence
of packet-modifying or packet-filtering middleboxes (e.g.,
NATs and firewalls).
Req 4. Autonomous peer discovery: DENA should not re-
quire any additional infrastructure to detect a peer DENA.
Such additional requirements would create complications
regarding who would build and maintain the additional in-
frastructure and these complications will hinder incremen-
tal deployment.
5. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
DENA
This section describes the DENA design shown in Fig-
ure 4, which shows the major components (discovery pro-
tocol and path management) and the corresponding sections
where the descriptions for the components can be found.
New
Flow?
DENA Detection  (§5.1.2)
Pre-
Filter
Edit Distance 
Filter
Y
DENA 
Detected?
Y
DENA 
BootStrap
(§5.1.3)
Path Management (§5.2)
Path Quality 
Measurement
(§5.2.1)
Path Selection
(§5.2.2)
N
Incoming
Packets
Outgoing
Packets
N
Figure 4: Major DENA components.
5.1 Discovery Protocol
The goals of the DENA discovery protocol are 1) to au-
tomatically and transparently (i.e., without interfering with
active data flows) detect the presence of a remote peer and
2) to exchange bootstrapping information that is necessary
for constructing paths over SCION to the peer DENA.
Discovery is performed whenever a DENA device detects
a new communication flow, identified by the 5-tuple infor-
mation (source IP, destination IP, source port, destination
port, and protocol number) of the packets in the flow. Ports
are used in addition to the source and destination address
pairs so that DENAs behind a shared NAT can be distin-
guished and identified. For example, in Figure 2, DENA1
cannot identify whether the communication flow is being
forwarded by DENA2 or DENA3 based only on the IP ad-
dress because the packets forwarded by both DENAs would
have the same source IP address, 5.5.5.5.
Before describing the two parts of the discovery proce-
dure (detection and bootstrapping), we describe the signal-
ing channel that is fundamental to our discovery procedure.
5.1.1 Signaling Channel
The most important challenge in DENA detection is to
construct a reliable signaling channel to the peer DENA
through which the DENA discovery message is transmit-
ted. Naively, one can define a dedicated UDP or TCP port,
and send a discovery message to that port. Although the ap-
proach may work for general cases, it can be problematic in
the presence of middle-boxes such as firewalls and intrusion
detection systems. Additionally, users may be required to
perform manual configurations on such devices, which vio-
lates the zero-configuration requirement from Section 4.3.
Alternatively, we suggest constructing the signaling chan-
nel using end-hosts’ traffic. This type of channel has been
widely studied in network steganography with two generic
approaches [16]: 1) manipulating structure of packet streams
(i.e., temporal variation in packet transmission times); and
2) manipulating packet headers, such as IP and TCP head-
ers. Although the signaling channel constructed via the for-
mer method tend to be more robust against various middle-
boxes, it unavoidably introduces undesirable delay and jitter
into end-hosts’ communication [17]. Thus, we use the latter
method to construct the signaling channel.
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To make DENA compatible with any IP based protocols,
we use the TTL and Identification (IPID) fields in the IP
header. Note that while we are hiding signals inside the
IP header, this is done for compatibility rather than for se-
curity. That is, our objective is not to prevent an observer
from seeing that the channel is being established, but rather
to prevent the signaling messages from being parsed (possi-
bly incorrectly) by the destination device in case a DENA
device is absent.
TTL. Although 255 is the literal maximum value of the TTL
field, IP paths on the Internet are generally shorter than 64
router hops (with 64 being the recommended initial TTL
value [27]). Hence, it is possible to decode the values that
the sender has chosen if the initial TTL values are chosen to
be at least 64 units apart. Since there can only be tuples of
at most three TTL values that are 64 units apart from each
other, we define three signals A, B, C from three TTL values,
64, 128, 192, respectively.
IPID. Since the use of the IPID field remains unspecified for
unfragmented packets, the field can be used to embed hidden
signals [31]. We define three hidden signals from the IPID
values so that the DENA detection procedure can be used
with both TTL-based and IPID-based signals.
We choose three sets of IPID values whose 12 most signif-
icant bits (MSBs) are 0x001, 0x7FF, 0xFFF as signals A, B,
and C, respectively. The values are chosen to be maximally
spaced apart (without including IPID value of zero) to pre-
vent operating systems that increment the IPID value by one
for each transmitted packet, from accidentally transmitting
all three of our defined signals during the DENA detection
procedure. In addition, there are 16 IPID values that corre-
spond to a hidden signal. Although fragmentation is discour-
aged in practice (for efficiency reasons), fragmented packets
do exist on the Internet [30]. The last four bits can change
to repeat our signals even when some of the IPID values are
used for fragmented packets.
5.1.2 DENA Detection
For detection, every DENA device periodically an-
nounces the discovery messages and responds to the received
discovery messages with the bootstrapping information (de-
fined in Section 5.1.3).
The discovery message is defined as a sequence of signals
known to all DENAs a priori (See Table 1 in Section 6).
Because the message is a sequence of hidden signals, the
message is encoded into a stream of consecutive packets.
Hence, when announcing the discovery message, a DENA
modifies the TTL and the IP ID fields of the packets that it is
forwarding. In our design, both TTL and IPID fields are used
to encode the same hidden signals to enhance the robustness
of DENA detection. Thus, even when one of the fields gets
scrubbed by middle-boxes, DENAs can use the other signal
to decode the discovery message.4
4During our experiment, we encountered a middle-box that scrubs
the TTL fields but keeps the IPID fields intact for TCP flows.
In addition to periodically emitting the discovery mes-
sage, DENA listens for the discovery message by exam-
ining the TTL and IPID fields from streams of incoming
packets. Identifying the discovery message from a stream of
packets is a challenge because the Internet, as a communica-
tion channel, may reorder, lose or duplicate packets. In fact,
the decoding problem at hand is similar to the well-known
insertion-deletion channel problem to which an efficient de-
coding algorithm is not yet found [18].
Combinatorial methods, which compute the difference be-
tween the transmitted and received messages, have been
studied for decoding under insertion-deletion channel. Edit
distance (i.e., Levenhstein distance [14]) provides a metric
to compare the difference between the two messages based
on the minimal number of edits (insertion, deletion, replace-
ment) that are necessary to transform one message to the
other. In our design, DENA concludes the presence of a
peer if the edit distance between the discovery message and
the received message is below the detection threshold value
(i.e., fewer number of edits than the detection threshold).
A DENA may falsely conclude the presence of a peer
DENA. On one hand, a DENA may fail to detect a remote
peer that is present (i.e., false negative) because the Internet
may drop or reorder the discovery message that the DENA
sends to its peer. On the other hand, a DENA may falsely
detect a peer that is not present (i.e., false positive) due to
the IPID fields in a stream of packets accidentally having the
right sequence as the discovery message. There are trade-
offs between these two probabilities, and they depend on
the decoding parameters, such as the length of the discov-
ery message as well as the detection threshold value.
When the decoding is solely based on edit distance, the
false positive probability can be high. To lower the false
positives, we place a light-weight pre-filter that checks the
approximate structure of the received message before com-
puting the edit distance. The pre-filter lowers the false posi-
tive probability while increasing the probabilities of the false
negatives. For an example design of the pre-filter and the de-
tection error analysis, see Section 6.
5.1.3 DENA Bootstrapping
After detecting the presence of a peer, bootstrapping in-
formation that is necessary for constructing SCION paths is
transmitted. The information can be transmitted through the
signaling channel described in Section 5.1.1. However, since
the signaling channel has very small capacity (i.e., log2(3)
bits per packet5), the channel’s capacity is too small to send
the bootstrapping information. (i.e., 10 bytes are needed for
SCION).
Alternatively, we define an out-of-band control-packet
that is generated by the DENAs to communicate bootstrap-
ping information. Since a DENA has detected the presence
of a peer, it can send a dedicated packet knowing that it will
5Assuming perfect channel that does not lose, reorder, or duplicate
packets.
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be parsed and discarded by the peer DENA before the packet
reaches the peer end-host. Hence, the control packets do not
disrupt end-host communication.
The control packet must be carefully constructed so that
it can be reliably delivered to the intended DENA, passing
through middle-boxes that may be present. To this end, con-
trol packets are created by duplicating the end-hosts’ pack-
ets. For UDP packets, the fact that end-hosts’ packets can
reach the destination ensures that the control packet would
be able to reach the peer DENA. For TCP packets, middle-
boxes have no choice but to accept the control packets, as it
cannot tell whether the control packets are generated due to
routine packet re-transmissions in the TCP protocol.
After duplicating end-host’s packet, the payload (after the
IP and transport header) is modified as follows. A DENA
identifier message is added at the beginning to indicate that
the message is a DENA control packet. Then the message
type to indicate the type of the control message and the mes-
sage payload are added.
5.2 Path Management
To achieve a high level of availability, it is necessary to pe-
riodically monitor the status and quality of both the IP path
and the SCION paths. Whenever the quality of the IP path
degrades below a threshold, communication between end-
hosts is switched over to a higher-quality path offered by
SCION. Furthermore, even after the switch, the IP path is
constantly monitored so that the communication may switch
back to the IP path after it is again reliable.
5.2.1 Path Quality Measurement
A DENA periodically measures packet loss rates for both
IP and SCION paths to all peer DENAs found during the
DENA Discovery Procedure. Unlike the DENA Discovery
Procedure, which is performed per flow, path measurement
is done per peer DENA. An advantage of this approach is
that it enables more accurate measurement, since a DENA
can have many associated flows (e.g., multiple concurrent
TCP connections to an HTTP server).
Measurement of the Active Path. For path quality mea-
surement of the active path, we rely on data packets from
end-hosts that are flowing between a pair of DENAs. We
adopt a packet loss measurement method that has been used
for quality measurements in MPLS networks [6]. Briefly,
the proposal uses a pair of measuring points each of which
maintains two counters for counting incoming and outgoing
packets, and computes packet loss rates based on the four
counters.
Specifically, the measurement proceeds as follows be-
tween two measuring points, A and B. First, A initiates the
measurement by sending a request message to B with the
outgoing packet counter value at the moment that the re-
quest is made. Then B replies to the request with the value of
the incoming packet counter as well as its outgoing packet
counter value. Upon receiving the reply, A marks its value of
the incoming packet counter. Finally, using the four counter
values, A computes the packet loss rate, which is defined to
be the maximum of the loss rates between incoming and out-
going paths.
When computing the packet loss rate, the difference in
counter values from current and past measurements are used.
Thus, the two measurement points A and B do not need
to synchronize the starting time at which both points start
counting outgoing and incoming packets.
For our context, the two measurement points would be
the pair of DENAs. In addition, the measurement request
and reply packets needed for the measurement are imple-
mented using the DENA control messages described in Sec-
tion 5.1.2.
The MPLS measurement approach offers several advan-
tages for our implementation. First, it is light-weight6; sec-
ond, synchronization between two DENAs is not necessary;
third, two-way channel delay can be computed with only a
small additional overhead (see Frost et al. [6] for details).
Measurement for Fail-over Paths. The quality of the
fail-over paths must be monitored so that the DENA can
ensure that the fail-over paths are healthy when attempting
to send data traffic over one of these paths. However, the
passive MPLS measurement cannot be used directly for the
fail-over path since no data traverse them.
To overcome such problem, we sample the traffic flowing
though the active path and transmit this traffic over the fail-
over paths. Since the loss rate of both outgoing and incoming
traffic are necessary, we need bi-directional traffic flowing
through the fail-over paths. Hence, the two DENAs need to
coordinate the time when data traffic through the active path
is replicated on the fail-over paths.
To coordinate the measurement intervals between two
DENAs, we use the DENA control channel (Section 5.1.3).
Two DENAs exchange a “start message” to start the mea-
surement and a “stop message” to stop the measurement. An
advantage of this approach is that it requires no form of time
synchronization, which can be difficult to achieve without
introducing additional complexity.
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Stop2
Stop1
Start2
Start1
MeasBegin
Time_
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Done
TX A
TX A
RX B
RX A
RX A
TX B
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B
C
D
A Start
Start Ack
Stop Ack
Stop
Initiation
Phase
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Termination + Path Decision
Phase
Measurement
Phase
TX D
Timeout
(RX A) AND
(My Id > Peer Id)
Figure 5: State machine for the Path Quality Measurement.
Figure 5 shows the state machine for the path quality mea-
6The measurement points keep trivial amount of states—the four
counter values for the previous measurement.
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surement, which consists of three phases. The Initiation
Phase is started when DENA transmits the Start message
and is completed when the initiating device receives a Start
ACK message from a peer. The initiating and responding
DENAs are decided based on the ID values that they ex-
change during the bootstrapping phase.
During the Measurement Phase, each DENA performs
the measurement to compute the packet loss rates of the fail-
over paths. Once the measurement is complete, the two peers
listen for Stop messages that are used for terminating the
measurement. In addition, both DENAs maintain timers to
mark the end of the measurement period. A DENA sends a
Stop message to its peer when the timer expires. Upon suc-
cessfully exchanging the Stop and Stop ACK messages be-
tween the two DENAs, the path measurement cycle is com-
pleted.
In addition to marking the end of an measurement inter-
val, the Stop and Stop ACK messages serve another pur-
pose. These messages contain the packet loss rates and their
decisions regarding which path to use to forward end-hosts’
data traffic.
Lastly, similar to the TCP connection tear-down proce-
dure, we implement a timeout state (i.e., Time Wait state) so
that a DENA that sends the Stop ACK is sure that the peer
DENA has received the Stop ACK message.
Path Keep-Alive based on Active Probing In cases
where a path drops all packets (e.g., link failure), our mea-
surement does not work. To cope with such failures, a
DENA periodically exchanges ICMP probe messages with
the peer DENA through all available paths. If a DENA does
not receive any response for consecutive probe messages
from a path, the DENA considers the path to be unavail-
able. Additionally, the DENA immediately terminates the
ongoing path measurement and starts a new measurement.
5.2.2 Path Selection
Path selection is performed whenever a path measurement
is completed (when DENA reaches the Done state). A new
path is selected as follows: 1) whenever the loss rate of the
IP path is lower than the threshold, a DENA chooses the IP
path, 2) if the loss rate is higher than the threshold and if
there is a SCION path that has lower packet loss rate than
the threshold the SCION path is chosen, 3) if none of the
paths has lower packet loss rate than the threshold, the path
with the lowest loss rate is chosen.
5.3 Implementation
The proof-of-concept prototype of the DENA consists of
3K lines of C code. The implementation runs on Linux, us-
ing the Netfilter Queue (nfqueue) Library [32] which en-
ables IP tables firewall decisions to be made in user-space.
We use the nfqueue library, which allows packet modifi-
cation before accepting a packet, to manipulate packets and
encode the hidden signals. DENA control messages also
make use of the library.
6. EVALUATION OF DENA DESIGN
We validate our design and implementation of DENA
through simulation and real-world evaluation over the
SCION testbed.7 More specifically, we are interested in
1) ensuring our implementation meets design objectives;
2) confirming that the FIA measuring the false positive and
false negative probabilities during DENA detection; and
3) evaluating the effectiveness of the path quality measure-
ment described in Section 5.2.1.
6.1 Conformance to Requirements
DENAs are deployed between the customer’s end-hosts
and their Internet connection, which requires no changes to
the end-host itself (Req 1). DENAs do not require any man-
ual configuration (such as IP addresses) by users. Once con-
figured by ISPs, DENAs are designed to be plug-and-play
(Req 2).
Although DENAs generate control packets, these pack-
ets by design are not forwarded to end-hosts. Thus, end-
hosts should never receive or need to parse control pack-
ets. DENAs can work in the presence of various types of
middle-boxes and NATs, which satisfies the robustness re-
quirement (Req 3). Furthermore, as control packets (which
are opportunistically duplicated from end-host traffic) are in-
distinguishable from data packets at the IP and transport lay-
ers, they can be forwarded by middle-boxes without being
filtered.
Finally, the DENA Discovery Procedure satisfies the self-
discovery requirement (Req 4), since it does not require ad-
ditional infrastructure for peer DENA detection.
6.2 DENA Detection Procedure Analysis
As discussed in Section 5.1.2, the proposed DENA de-
tection procedure is subject to both false positives (i.e., de-
tecting a DENA when it is not present) and false negatives
(i.e., not detecting a DENA when it is present). In this sec-
tion we evaluate false positive and false negative probabili-
ties through simulation. We summarize the parameters that
we use for the DENA simulation and implementation in Ta-
ble 1.
Figure 6 shows the probability that a DENA fails to de-
tect the presence of a peer as packet loss rates are varied
at 1% increments from 0% to 10% within five attempts of
DENA detection. For precision, we take the average of one
million runs for each fixed packet loss rate. As expected,
the false negative probability increases with increased packet
loss rate. In addition, the false negative probability is higher
when the pre-filter is used or when the lower edit distance
threshold value is used.
Furthermore, false negative probability decreases expo-
nentially as the DENA Detection is performed multiple
times (not shown in Figure). For example, at 10% packet
loss rate, there is about 35% chance that a DENA fails
7The topology of the testbed can be found at
https://polybox.ethz.ch/public.php?service=files&t=1d1c25c87b2a414dade07c717eb5647c.
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Discovery
Message ABABABABCCCCCCCCABABABAB
Pre-Filter
1. Divide decoded message into 3 blocks of
8 signals.
2. Check if there are at least three A-signals
and three B-signals each in the first and the
third blocks
3. Check if there are at least six C-signals
in the second block
Edit distance
Threshold 3 or 5
Meas. Interval 1 seconds
Meas. Period 1 seconds
Path Switch
Thresh. 5% Packet Loss
Table 1: Parameter settings for the DENA simulation and imple-
mentation.
to detect a remote peer if the detection procedure is per-
formed only once for the case with pre-filter and the detec-
tion threshold of three. However, when the detection proce-
dure is repeated for five times, the false negative probability
decreases to about 0.6% as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Probability that DENA fails to detect it a remote peer
within five attempts of the detection procedure.
A trade-off exists between missed detection and incorrect
detection. That is, the settings that have yielded higher false
negative probability have lower false positive detection prob-
ability. To simulate this effect, we input a stream of packets
that consists of one million packets where a random IPID
value is chosen for each of the one million packets. Then,
we check whether a DENA would incorrectly identify the
presence of a peer within the stream. We repeat this simu-
lation 10,000 times to get an estimate of the false positive
probability, and the results are summarized in Table 2.
The false positive probabilities are lower when a pre-filter
is used. Also, the false positive probabilities are lower for
the lower threshold value as the received message has to be
closer (i.e., fewer number of edits) to the discovery mes-
sage. Note that during regular operation, DENA would not
attempt more than a few detection attempts. Thus, the val-
ues in Table 2 represent a worst-case scenario. For our next
analysis, we use the threshold value of 5 with the prefilter as
it strikes the balance between FP and FN probabilities.
Threshold w/ prefilter w/o prefilter
3 0.02% 0.03%
5 4.4% 11.8%
Table 2: False positive probability of the DENA Detection Pro-
cedure against a stream of one million packets with random IPID
values.
6.3 Path Switching Based on Path Quality
Measurement
The purpose of this experiment is to confirm that our
DENA implementation can react to the change in path qual-
ity and switch the end-hosts’ traffic to alternate paths if nec-
essary. For the experiment setup, we deployed two DENAs
on the SCION global testbed. One was placed at ETH
Zu¨rich (AS6) and the other at CMU (AS14). We placed a
WANem Emulator [29] on the IP path from AS6 to AS14,
which allowed us to introduce arbitrary packet loss rates into
the IP path.
We deploy an end-host that runs an HTTP server in AS14,
and deploy an end-host that downloads (via the wget appli-
cation) a large file from the HTTP server in AS6. At ap-
proximately 80 seconds into the file download, we introduce
10% packet loss on the IP path, and then remove the packet
loss at around 110 seconds.
At the end-host in AS6, we record the throughput of the
file download as well as the data rates on both paths to vali-
date our implementation. Throughput information is plotted
in Figure 7, showing the change in throughput over time as
for the wget application as well as the two paths.
Initially, the end-host’s traffic flows through the IP path.
In addition, there is about 10% of the traffic flowing through
the SCION path for measuring the path loss rate of the fail-
over path. When 10% packet loss is introduced on the IP
path at around 81 seconds, the two DENAs switch over to
the SCION path about 2 seconds into the degradation. The
switch can be verified by the increase in throughput at the
SCION path to that of the actual file-transfer rate as well as
the decrease in throughput at the IP path.
Finally, after the 10% packet loss is removed from the IP
path, the DENAs move the end-hosts’ traffic back to the IP
path after about two seconds of delay. This test was repeated
5 times obtaining comparable results in each iteration.
7. DEPLOYMENT ANALYSIS
In the previous section, we have shown that DENA can
improve the availability of the end-hosts’ connections de-
spite changes in network conditions (e.g., when there is a
packet loss in the Internet). In this section, we evaluate the
availability benefits of a FIA when there are adversaries that
perform IP prefix hijacking attacks. In addition, we analyze
the benefits that deploying ISPs could accrue.
To evaluate the deployability and availability benefits of a
FIA, we perform series of BGP simulations by extending the
BSIM simulator [13], where the BGP paths are computed us-
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Figure 7: Path switching based on measured path quality.
ing route selection based on the standard BGP routing poli-
cies (Gao-Rexford Model [7]). As our topology dataset, we
use a recent snapshot of the CAIDA Inferred AS Relation-
ship dataset.
7.1 Tunneled Paths Resilience
The announcement of /24 prefixes for the tunnels offers
protection of the tunnels against prefix hijacking attacks;
however, the /24 prefix announcements cannot prevent all
hijacking attacks. As the length (in AS hops) of the tun-
nel increases, the resiliency against hijacking decreases. In
this section, we investigate the benefit (i.e., resilience against
prefix hijacking attack) that a path constructed using a series
of short tunnels can provide over a single BGP path.
For our study, we use the following notation:
(ASx, ASy): BGP path (list of ASes) between ASx and ASy,
|(ASx, ASy)|: length (expressed in AS-level links) of
(ASx, ASy) path,
TN : number of deploying ASes AS1, AS2, ..., ASTN that form
the overlay end-to-end tunnel,
TL: length of the longest tunnel segment (i.e., maximum
|(ASi, ASi+1)| for i ∈ [1, TN − 1]),
LBGP : length of the BGP path between AS1 and ASTN
(i.e., |(AS1, ASTN )|),
LT : length of the tunneled path betweeen AS1 and ASTN
(i.e.,
TN−1∑
i=1
|(ASi, ASi+1)|).
We assume that the first node of an end-to-end tunnel path
(AS1) is the source while the last (ASTN ) is the destina-
tion. Then, LBGP expresses the length of the BGP path be-
tween source and destination. We also assume that traffic
from source to destination over the end-to-end tunnel tra-
verses overlay nodes AS2, AS3, ..., ASTN−1 in that order.
The tunnel’s path on an AS-level is a concatenation of BGP
paths: (AS1, AS2), (AS2, AS3)..., (ASTN−1, ASTN ).
For our simulation, we consider two adversary strategies
designed to hijack traffic from source to destination: 1)
weak adversary which announces only the destination’s pre-
fix, and 2) strong adversary which announces all prefixes of
AS2, AS3, ..., ASTN . In both cases an adversary launches
attacks from a randomly compromised AS, however he can-
not compromise ASes on the path between source and des-
tination. Note that ARROW [22] only considers the weak
adversary model and does not consider the strong adversary
model.
In this experiment, we simulate 8 scenarios by varying
TN , TL, and LBGP to analyze the resilience that tunnels can
provide against prefix hijacking attacks. For each scenario,
while incrementing the number of adversarial ASes from 1
to 7, we construct and simulate 1000 random and unique
tunnel deployments, where T1 and TN are randomly chosen
from multi-homed stub ASes and the other tunnel nodes are
chosen from all other ASes.8
Figure 8 summarizes the results of our simulation. In
each graph in the figure, the x-axis represents the number
of adversaries (varied from 1 to 7) and the y-axis represents
probability values that an attack on the tunneled path will be
successful. The two figures on the left show the hijack prob-
ability of the tunneled path for source and destination AS
pairs that are four BGP hops apart (LBGP=4); and, on the
right five BGP hops apart (LBGP =5). Moreover, the upper
two figures show the results against weak adversaries while
the lower two figures show the results against strong adver-
saries. Lastly, each plot also shows hijack probability for the
BGP paths (green line with plus markers).
Our results show that the hijack probability increases as
the number of adversaries increases and that the probability
is higher for the strong adversary model than the weak adver-
sary model. Furthermore, against the weak adversary model,
the probabilities of hijacking the tunneled paths are similar
for the two cases that have the same tunnel segment length
(i.e., TL) but different total length (i.e., LT )—on the upper
two figures, the purple lines with diamond makers and the
red line with inverted triangle markers almost overlap with
each other. This is because the weak adversary model can
only attack the last tunnel segment (i.e., (TN−1, TN ) as the
weak adversaries only announce the prefix of the destination
(i.e., TN ).
The results show that the tunneled paths have lower hi-
jack probability than the BGP paths even if the length of the
tunneled path (i.e., LT ) is longer than that of the BGP paths
(i.e., LBGP ). But, the result also shows that if the length of
the tunneled paths becomes too long (e.g., twice the length
of the BGP paths), the tunneled paths become more suscep-
tible to hijacking attacks. However, in practice, it is highly
unlikely that the tunneled paths would be twice the length of
the BGP paths.
Lastly, the results show that the composition of the tun-
neled path affects the resilience against prefix hijacking at-
tacks: a tunneled path that is composed of shorter individ-
ual segments is more resilient than a path that is composed
of longer individual segments. For the two cases where
8 To build more confidence of our results, we have run four inde-
pendent sets of 1000 deployments for all 8 scenarios and confirmed
that the results were similar across the four sets.
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LT ≤ 6, the hijack probability is significantly lower when
the length of the individual tunnel is kept shorter. In Fig-
ure 8, this can be seen by comparing the blue line with ’x’
markers and the purple line with diamond markers. More-
over, the result shows that the tunneled paths that have
longer total length but shorter individual tunnel segments
(i.e., LT ≤ 8, red lines with inverted triangle markers) is
more resilient than the tunneled paths that have shorter total
length but longer individual segments (i.e., LT ≤ 6, blue
lines with ’x’ markers).
7.2 Potential Customer Base
In this section, we investigate the proportion of multi-
homed stub ASes that are N-hops (i.e., TL = N ) away
from any of the deploying ASes as we vary the number of
ASes which deploy the FIA. This experiment should assist in
quantifying the potential customer base (measured in num-
ber of ASes) as the FIA deployment increases.
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Figure 9: Proportion of ASes that can communicate over FIA.
In this experiment, we randomly choose ASes to deploy
the FIA such that the distance between deploying ASes
would be at most N BGP hops (i.e., TL = N ). Then, for
all multi-homed stub ASes, we evaluate the number of ASes
that are within N hops from any of the FIA deploying ASes.
The two steps are repeated 5,000 times, and we report the av-
erage in Figure 9, which shows the proportion of the ASes
that could be reached within N hops from the FIA deploy-
ment as number of deploying AS changes from 1 to 20.
Our results show that for higher values of TL, a larger
portion of the multi-homed stub ASes were within the reach
of the deploying ASes. Combining the results from Sec-
tion 7.1, we can conclude that for large values of TL, de-
ploying ASes obtain larger customer-base at the expense of
availability guarantees against prefix hijacking attacks. Con-
versely, when offering higher availability guarantees, the
customer-base becomes much smaller (i.e., TL = 2).
As expected, the number of deploying ASes increases
with the size of customer base. In fact, when there are 20
deploying ASes, the customer-base nearly spans across the
entire Internet for the cases with TL ≥ 4. In addition, even
with only one deploying AS, there are multi-homed stub
ASes that could benefit from the FIA deployment, and for
the cases with TL ≥ 4, more than half of the multi-homed
stub ASes could access the FIA deployment within TL hops.
Lastly, Figure 9 offers another interesting observation—
reduced benefit (in terms of increase in customer base) as
more ASes participate in FIA deployment. This can be in-
ferred from the gradient of the plots, which tends to zero as N
increases. Hence, the result suggests that beyond the initial
phase of the deployment, a different incentive model may be
necessary to further drive the FIA deployment.
8. DISCUSSION
8.1 Practical Implications on Deployment
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NAT Implications. As discussed in Section 4.3, a DENA
should work in the presence of middle-boxes such as NATs.
When a DENA is placed in-between a NAT and an end-host
(see DENA2 in Figure 2), communication over the SCION
path may not work. For instance, when the communication
between Host1 and Host2 in Figure 2 is carried out through
the SCION path, DENA2 cannot deliver Host1’s packets to
Host2 without being given Host2’s internal address.
To address this problem, when DENA2 and DENA1 ex-
change bootstrapping information during the DENA Dis-
covery Process, DENA2 includes the private address of
Host2.
Another problem is the communication between GW2
and DENA2. Because of NAT, GW2 cannot send a packet
to DENA2 before DENA2 starts forwarding packets via
SCION. To avoid this problem, DENA2 periodically ex-
changes keep-alive messages to its assigned gateway, per-
forming NAT hole-punching. Since the DENA itself does
not have an IP address, it borrows one of the IP addresses
it has learned from the end-hosts to perform the hole-
punching.
MTU Implications. The measurement and correct con-
figuration of MTU size is critical for any scheme that re-
quires encapsulation, such as the tunnels used in our system.
When end-hosts perform the path MTU discovery protocol
(PMTUD [19]), DENA can respond with an MTU size small
enough to provide enough space for encapsulation. In the
event that an end-host does not respond to PMTUD mes-
sages (fewer than 10% of devices do not [15]), packet frag-
mentation would be required, increasing the complexity.
8.2 Device Configuration and Distribution
Although DENA does not require any configuration by
end-users, it requires configuration by ISPs prior to distribu-
tion to customers. Configuration would include information
necessary for bootstrapping the DENA into the FIA deploy-
ment (i.e., in case of SCION, this includes SCION ISD ID,
AS AID9, and IP address of the gateway that a DENA would
contact to access the SCION network). We note that such
configurations are common in today’s Internet when ISPs
distribute cable or DSL modems to their subscribers. In ad-
dition, for customers that already have access devices (i.e.,
cable or DSL modems), the firmwares of these devices could
be updated to support DENA functionality.
8.3 Applicability to Other FIAs
The DENA is a generic device that creates tunnels to in-
terconnect two FIA deploying islands. Hence, it is possible
to use DENA for other FIAs, as long as tunneling can be
used to interconnect two FIA deploying islands. The im-
portant part in bootstrapping a FIA is to identify the proper
incentives for the early adopters. For instance, for more effi-
cient distribution and access to the content to early adopters,
9In SCION, each AS is identified by the ID of the ISolation Domain
(ISD) that the AS is in as well as the identifier of the AS (AID).
NDN could be deployed. In NDN deployment, DENA
would translate user data requests into an interest packet and
send it to the NDN deployment. When the requested data
arrives at the DENA, it delivers the data to the user.
9. CONCLUSION
We have motivated, designed, and evaluated an incre-
mental deployment strategy for Future Internet Architec-
tures. Through both simulation and real-world implemen-
tation and testing, we demonstrated tangible availability im-
provements for deploying ISPs with comparatively little de-
ployment cost. Our evaluation used SCION to assess the
feasibility of our proposal, but the proposed incremental de-
ployment strategy remains compatible with other FIAs.
While availability alone will likely be insufficient to moti-
vate full wide-scale deployment, this paper focuses on con-
vincing early adopters to use a new architecture. Once a
base set of ISPs and customers have deployed a FIA, a new
strategy may be necessary to encourage a majority of ISPs to
deploy. For example, the next set of deploying users could
be interested in mobility or content-centric networking, but
such analysis is left open to future research.
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